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Fulton County Superior Court
***EFILED***QW
Date: 3/12/2019 9:46 PM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA

DRUMMOND FINANCIAL
SERVICES, LLC, et al., 1
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.
2014CV253677

Plaintiffs,
V.

TMX FINANCE HOLDINGS, INC.,
et al.,2

Business Case Div. 4

Defendants.

ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

The above styled matter is before the Court on: (1) Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff
TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. 's ("TitleMax Georgia") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
("TitleMax Georgia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment"); and (2) Plaintiffs North
American Title Loans, LLC ("NATL") and Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc. 's ("CLM") Motion for
Summary Judgment on Defendant TitleMax of Georgia, Inc.'s Twenty-Third Defense and
Counterclaim for Unfair Competition ("NATL and CLM's Motion for Partial Summary
The named Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants are: Drummond Financial Services, LLC; North
American Title Loans, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company; North American Title Loans, LLC, a South
Carolina limited liability company; North American Title Loans, LLC, a New Mexico limited liability company;
North American Title Loans, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; Anderson Financial Services, LLC;
LoanSmart, LLC; Kipling Financial Services, LLC; Huffman Title Pawn, Inc.; LoanMax, LLC; Mid-American Title
Loans, LLC; Fairfax Financial Services, LLC; Wellshire Financial Services, LLC; Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc.;
Meadowwood Financial Services, LLC; Select Management Funding, LLC; Andr, Inc.; Atlanta Title Loans, Inc.;
Aycox, Inc.; Aycox & Aycox, Clayton, Inc.; Aycox & Martin Enterprises, Inc.; Aycox Enterprises, Ltd.; Cash Loans
of Stone Mountain, Inc.; Instant Cash Loans on Car Titles, Inc.; LoanMax Title Loans, LLC; and Mableton Car Title
Loans, Inc. Plaintiffs are referred to collectively herein as "Plaintiffs" or "Drummond."
2
The named Defendants and Counterclaimants are: TMX Finance Holdings, Inc.; TM.X Finance, LLC; TMX
Credit, Inc.; TitleMax of Ohio, Inc.; TitleMax of Utah, Inc.; TMX Finance of Virginia, Inc.; TitleMax of Virginia,
Inc.; TitleMax of Alabama, Inc.; TitleMax of Georgia, Inc.; TMX Credit of New Mexico, LLC; TitleMax of
Arizona, Inc.; TitleMax of Missouri, Inc.; TMX Finance of Texas, Inc.; TitleMax of Texas, Inc.; TitleMax of South
Carolina, Inc.; and Does I through I 0. Defendants are referred to collectively herein as "Defendants" or "TitleMax".

Judgm ent"). Having considered the entire record and argument of counsel at a March 12, 2019
hearing held in this matter, the Court orders as follows:
SUMMARY

This case concerns a dispute between businesses which compete in the title pawn
industry. Plaintiffs are companies affiliated by a common ownership and control engaged in the
business of making loans to consumers secured by motor vehicles ti.e. title pawns or loans).
Plaintiffs include both loan brokers and direct lenders. Plaintiffs Drummond Financial Services,
Inc. and LoanStar3 act as loan brokers in that they assist customers seeking to obtain title loans
from third-party lenders.4 The remaining Plaintiffs are direct lenders who specialize in making
title loans directly to consumers. The various TitleMax Defendants are part of a conglomerate of
related companies also engaged in the title loan business, including brokers and direct lenders.
Defendants are direct competitors of Plaintiffs and operate stores across the United States.
Plaintiffs assert Defendants have committed various tortious acts while engaged m a
nationwide campaign to systematically steal their customers. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that
Defendants: (1) improperly accessed Department of Motor Vehicle ("DMV") records in
violation of federal and state laws to obtain information regarding Plaintiffs' current and
prospective customers and then used that information to solicit and divert Plaintiffs' customers to
the Defendants; (2) improperly entered Plaintiffs' premises in order to solicit Plaintiffs'
customers; and (3) offered Plaintiffs' employees monetary compensation for diverting Plaintiffs'
current and prospective customers away from Plaintiffs to Defendants. Plaintiffs have asserted
six claims against the Defendants including misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition,
"LoanStar" collectively refers to Plaintiffs Wellshire Financial Services LLC and Meadowwood Financial
Services, LLC.
4
LoanMax Title Loans was added as a Counterclaim Defendant by Court order but according to Plaintiffs it
has never operated any of Plaintiffs' stores in Georgia and has never engaged in title lending. Second Amended
Complaint ("SAC"), p. 10 n. I.
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two counts of tortious interference with prospective contracts and business relationships, trespass
and civil conspiracy.
TitleMax Georgia asserts a counterclaim against North American Title Loans, LLC, a
Georgia limited liability company ("NATL") and Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc. ("CLM") (and
other Counterclaim Defendants), alleging they have violated the Georgia Pawnshop Act,
O.C.G.A. §44-12-130 et seq., through their use of the word "loan" in their names and advertising

("First Counterclaim"). 5 Based on the foregoing, TitleMax Georgia has asserted claims against
NATL and CLM for :

( 1) unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act; (2) unfair

competition in violation of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act; and (3) civil conspiracy.
Additionally, certain TitleMax Claimants have asserted a second counterclaim alleging
certain Drummond parties instructed employees to visit TitleMax stores falsely claiming to be
customers looking for a title loan or posing as a potential recovery vendor, who then allegedly
lied about needing to use the restroom to gain access to restricted, non-public areas ofTitleMax's
stores in order

to photograph their trade secret financial information (contained on "goal

boards"), information which is then allegedly shared throughout Plaintiffs' corporate structure.
Based on the foregoing, the TitleMax Claimants have brought claims alleging: (1) trespass;
(2) misappropriation and theft of trade secrets; (3) violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act; (4) conversion (in the alternative); (5) civil conspiracy; and (6)
entitlement to litigation expenses.
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This counterclaim was titled "Twenty-Third Defense and Counterclaim of Defendant TitleMax of Georgia,
Inc. Against Plaintiffs North American Title Loans, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, and Cash Loans of
Marietta, Inc." in Defendants' Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim filed on December 29, 2014 as well
as in amended pleadings filed on August 17, 2017 and October 19, 2017. In Defendants' Answer and Affirmative
Defenses to Second Amended Complaint and Defendants' Amended Counterclaims, filed on April 26, 2018, it is
referred to as "First Counterclaim by Defendant TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. - Against Plaintiffs - Andr, Inc.; Atlanta
Title Loans, Inc.; Aycox, Inc.; Aycox & Aycox, Clayton, Inc.; Aycox & Martin Enterprises, Ltd.; Aycox
Enterprises, Ltd.; Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc.; Cash Loans of Stone Mountain, Inc.; Instant Cash Loans on Car
Titles, Inc.; LoanMax Title Loans, LLC; Mableton Car Title Loans, Inc.; and North American Title Loans, LLC."
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ANALYSIS
I.

Standard on Summary Judgment

Summary judgment should be granted only when the movant shows "that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). "A defendant may do this by showing the court that the
documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no
evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiffs case."
Scarbrough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829, 830, 525 S.E.2d 377, 378 (1999) (quoting Lau's Corp.
v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491,491,405 S.E.2d 474, 475-76 (1991). To avoid summary judgment, "an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [O.C.G.A. §9-11-56], must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A. §9-11-56(e).
"[A]t the summary judgment stage, courts are required to construe the evidence most
favorably towards the nonmoving party, who is given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and
possible inferences." Smith v. Tenet Health Sys. Spalding, Inc., 327 Ga. App. 878, 879, 761
S.E.2d 409, 411 (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). See Word v. Henderson, 220 Ga.
846, 848, 142 S.E.2d 244,246 (1965) ("Where the evidence on motion for summary judgment is
ambiguous or doubtful, the party opposing the motion must be given the benefit of all reasonable
doubts and of all favorable inferences and such evidence construed most favorably to the
opposing party opposing the motion"). However, "[m]ere speculation, conjecture, or possibility
[are] insufficient to preclude summary judgment." State v. Rozier, 288 Ga. 767, 768 (2011)
(quoting Rosales v. Davis, 260 Ga. App. 709, 712, 580 S.E.2d 662, 665 (2003)).
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II.

TitleMax Georgia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

TitleMax Georgia moves for summary judgment as to liability only on its First
Counterclaim against NATL and CLM for false advertising under the Lanham Act. NATL was
formed on August 10, 2001 and previously operated a store named "Cash Loans on Car Titles"
located at 3122 Deans Bridge Road, Augusta, Georgia. CLM was formed on July 16, 1996 and
previously operated a store named "Atlanta Title Loans" located at 2089 South Cobb Drive,
Marietta, Georgia. However, in May 2015, CLM transferred the operation of its store to AndR,
Inc., while NATL transferred the operation of its store to Instant Cash Loans on Car Title, Inc.
Nevertheless, insofar as NATL and CLM engaged in "pawn transactions", TitleMax Georgia
alleges their use of the term "loans" in their advertising during the period of December 29, 2010
through May 2015 (before they transferred the operation of their stores to different entities)
violates the Georgia Pawnshop Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-130 et seq.,6 and constitutes false
advertising under the federal Lanham Act as a matter oflaw.
A. Georgia Pawnshop Act
"Pawn transactions are governed by the statutory scheme laid out with considerable
specificity in the Georgia Pawnshop Act." Mack v. Georgia Auto Pawn, Inc., 262 Ga. App. 277,
278, 585 S.E.2d 661, 662 (2003) (citing Glinton v. And R, Inc., 271 Ga. 864, 867, 524 S.E.2d
481 (1999)). See Hooks v. Cobb Ctr. Pawn & Jewelry Brokers, Inc., 241 Ga. App. 305,309,527
S.E.2d 566, 570 (1999) ("[T]he pawnbroker statute, O.C.G.A. § 44-12-130 et seq.,
comprehensively and specifically regulates the subject of pawnshop transactions"). Under the
Act, "pawn transactions" means "any loan on the security of pledged goods or any purchase of
pledged goods on the condition that the pledged goods may be redeemed or repurchased by the
pledgor or seller for a fixed price within a fixed period of time." O.C.G.A. §44-12-130(3).
6

Herein "Georgia Pawnshop Act" or "Act."
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Further, "pawnbroker" is defined as:
any person engaged in whole or in part in the business of lending money
on the security of pledged goods, or in the business of purchasing tangible
personal property on the condition that it may be redeemed or repurchased
by the seller for a fixed price within a fixed period of time, or in the
business of purchasing tangible personal property from persons or sources
other than manufacturers or licensed dealers as a part of or in conjunction
with the business activities described in this paragraph.
O.C.G.A. §44-12-130(2).
In 1992, the Georgia Pawnshop Act was amended extensively to, inter alia, address

issues involving motor vehicle pawn transactions. See 1992 Ga. Laws 1426. See also J. Anthony
Love, Pawnbrokers: Provide Comprehensive Legislation Regulating Loans on Motor Vehicle
Titles, 9 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 323 (1992). It has been said that the legislative purpose behind these
changes was "a desire to bring uniformity to the pawnbroker industry and to reduce abusive and
unconscionable agreements arising from motor vehicle title loans" and to "protect consumers."
Id. at 326, 328. Most relevant to this litigation, the 1992 amendment added a provision which
regulates advertising by pawnbrokers:
Any pawnbroker as defined in paragraph (2) of Code Section 44-12-130
shall include most prominently in any and all types of advertisements the
word "pawn" or the words "pawn transaction." A pawnbroker shall not
use the term "loan" in any advertisements or in connection with any
advertising of the business of the pawnbroker; provided, however, that
the provisions of this sentence shall not apply to a pawnbroker in
business on March 1, 1992, which uses the term "loan" in connection
with the name of the business or with advertising of the business.
O.C.G.A. §44-12-138(a)(I) (emphasis added). This provision was "designed to eliminate
confusion on the part of consumers as to what type of transaction is offered by a particular
business such as a pawnbroker." Love, supra, at 327. See also State of Georgia ex rel.
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General of the State of Georgia v. First American Title Lending
of Georgia, LLC, Superior Court of Fulton County, No. 2017CV297877 (lawsuit brought by the
6

Georgia Attorney General against a pawnbroker for using the term "loan" in advertising and not
using "pawn" or "pawn transactions", taking the position that such conduct violates O.C.G.A.
§44-12-138(a)(l) as well as the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. §10-1-393(a)).

B. Lanham Act
Here, TitleMax Georgia alleges NATL and CLM's use of the term "loans" in their
advertising not only violated the Georgia Pawnshop Act but also violated the Lanham Act.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)) creates a "federal cause of
action for unfair competition." Optimum Techs., Inc. v. Henkel Consumer Adhesives, Inc., 496
F.3d 1231, 1247 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Univ. of Fla. v. KPB, Inc., 89 F.3d 773, 775 (11th Cir.
1996)). It provides in relevant part:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services ... uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin,false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which ... in
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(l)(B).
"The intent of this provision is to protect "commercial interests [that] have been harmed
by a competitor's false advertising, and [to secure] to the business community the advantages of
reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to
those who have not." Natural Answers, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 529 F.3d 1325,
1330-31 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d
1156, 1168 (11th Cir.2007).7
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Section 45 of the Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 provides:
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To succeed on a false advertising claim under 15 U.S.C.A. § l 125(a)(l)(B), a plaintiff

must establish that:
(1) the advertisements of the opposing party were false or misleading;
(2) the advertisements deceived, or had the capacity to deceive,
consumers; (3) the deception had a material effect on purchasing
decisions; (4) the misrepresented product or service affects interstate
commerce; and (5) the movant has been--0r is likely to be-injured as a
result of the false advertising.
Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004).
The first element of the test above requires a plaintiff to show that the advertisements at
issue were either "(l) commercial claims that are literally false as a factual matter" or "(2) claims
that may be literally true or ambiguous but which implicitly convey a false impression, are
misleading in context, or likely to deceive consumers." Id. at 1261 (quoting United Indus. Corp.
v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1998)). See Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d
218, 229 (2d Cir. 1999), as amended on reh'g (Sept. 29, 1999) ("There are two types of
actionable false advertising: (1) advertising which makes claims which are literally false on their
face, and (2) advertising which, although literally true on its face, is perceived by a significant
proportion of the relevant market as making 'subliminal' or 'implicit' claims which are provably
false. With regard to the second type of false advertising, the courts sometimes say that the
advertising has a tendency to 'mislead, confuse or deceive"') (citation omitted).

The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by
making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to
protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial
legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to
prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies,
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and
remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and
unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations.
"Most of the enumerated purposes are relevant to false-association cases; a typical false-advertising case will
implicate only the Act's goal of'protect [ing] persons engaged in [commerce within the control of Congress] against
unfair competition."' Lexmark Int'!. Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 131, 134 S. Ct. 1377,
1389, 188 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2014).
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[P]laintiffs alleging a literal falsehood are claiming that a statement, on its
face, conflicts with reality, a claim that is best supported by comparing the
statement itself with the reality it purports to describe. By contrast,
plaintiffs alleging an implied falsehood are claiming that a statement,
whatever its literal truth, has left an impression on the listener that
conflicts with reality. This latter claim invites a comparison of the
impression, rather than the statement, with the truth.
Schering Corp .. 189 F.3d at 229 (citing Survey Evidence in Deceptive Advertising Cases Under

the Lanham Act: An Historical Review of Comments from the Bench, 954 PU/Corp. 83, 87-88
(1996)).
"A plaintiff attempting to establish the second kind of falsehood, that an advertisement is
literally true but misleading, must "present evidence of deception" in the form of consumer
surveys, market research, expert testimony, or other evidence. Consumer survey research often is
a key part of a Lanham Act claim alleging that an advertisement is misleading or deceptive."
Hickson Corp., 357 F.3d at 1261 (citations omitted). See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson * Merck
Consumer Phann. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp .. 960 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he
success of a plaintiffs implied falsity claim usually turns on the persuasiveness of a consumer
survey ... [W]here the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a statistically significant part of the
commercial audience holds the false belief allegedly communicated by the challenged
advertisement, the plaintiff cannot establish that it suffered any injury as a result of the
advertisement's message"); Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prod., Inc., 690 F .2d 312, 317 (2d Cir.
1982) ("When the challenged advertisement is implicitly rather than explicitly false, its tendency
to violate the Lanham Act by misleading, confusing or deceiving should be tested by public
reaction").
To succeed on a claim of false advertising the plaintiff must also establish "materiality",

i.e. that "the defendant's deception is likely to influence the [consumer's] purchasing decision."
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Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1250 (11th Cir.
2002) (quoting Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 311 (1st
Cir.2002) (internal quotations omitted). The materiality requirement, which must be established
even when an advertisement is literally false, is based on the premise that not all deceptions
affect consumer decisions." Id. at 1250. "A plaintiff may establish this materiality requirement
by proving that 'the defendants misrepresented an inherent quality or characteristic of the
product."' Id. ( quoting National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 855 (2d
Cir.1997)); Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC, 612 F.3d 1298, 1319 (11th Cir. 2010) (same).
Further,
in order for representations to constitute "commercial advertising or
promotion" under Section [1125(a)], they must be: (I) commercial speech;
(2) by a defendant who is in commercial competition with plaintiff; (3) for
the purpose of influencing consumers to buy defendant's goods or
services. While the representations need not be made in a "classic
advertising campaign," but may consist instead of more informal types of
"promotion," the representations (4) must be disseminated sufficiently to
the relevant purchasing public to constitute "advertising" or "promotion"
within that industry.
Suntree Techs., Inc., 693 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am.
Inst. of Physics, 859 F.Supp. 1521 (S.D.N.Y.1994)). See also Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber &
Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Advertising that affects interstate
commerce and solicitation of sales across state lines or between citizens of the United States and
citizens and subjects of a foreign nation is ... commerce within the meaning of the Lanham Act").
Moreover, "[a] party seeking monetary damages for false advertising in violation of 15
U.S.C. § l 125(a) of the Lanham Act must establish that it has been injured by the false
advertising." Trilink Saw Chain, LLC v. Blount, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1320 (N.D. Ga.
2008). See, e.g., Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst., 284 F.3d at 311 ("[W]hereas a showing
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that the defendant's activities are likely to cause confusion or to deceive customers is sufficient to
warrant injunctive relief, a plaintiff seeking damages must show actual harm to its business");
Keg Techs., Inc. v. Laimer, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2006) ("Compared to the
showing necessary to obtain an injunction, a higher standard of proof is required to recover
damages" for a Lanham Act violation); Practice Perfect, Inc. v. Hamilton Cty. Pharm. Ass'n, 732
F. Supp. 798, 804 (S.D. Ohio 1989) ("Section 43(a) was not intended to provide a windfall for
plaintiffs, and therefore the plaintiff must show that it sustained actual harm to its business as a
result of the defendant's misrepresentations"). Thus, "to recover money damages under the
[Lanh am] Act, a "[p]laintiff must prove both actual damages and a causal link between [the]

defendant's violation and those damages." United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175,
1180 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc.,
93 F.3d 511, 515 (8th Cir. 1996)). See also 15 U.S.C. § l l l 7(a).
C. Conclusions of Law
TitleMax Georgia contends record evidence establishes NATL and CLM's use of the
word "loan" in their advertising satisfies each element to show liability for false adverting under
the Lanham Act: use of the word "loan" rather than "pawn" or "pawn transaction" constitutes a
false or misleading description of fact or representation of fact as established under the Georgia
Pawnshop Act; it was used in interstate commerce given that NATL and CLM advertise on the
internet; the term "loan" was used in connection with commercial advertising regarding NATL
and CLM's services, pawn transactions; the description of a "pawn" as a "loan" misrepresents
the nature of the pawn transaction; and TitleMax Georgia, as a direct competitor of NATL and
CLM in the title pawn business, has been or is likely to be damaged by NATL and CLM's acts.

ll

NATL and CLM note the parties are competitors in the title lending industry. Insofar as
their business is to lend money to borrowers who use their car titles as collateral for the debt,
they urge any reasonable person would understand that the products being offered are "loans"
under any reasonable definition. They argue TitleMax Georgia essentially asks the Court to find
that an alleged violation of the Georgia Pawnshop Act constitutes a per se violation of the

Lanham Act. Although TitleMax Georgia takes the position that a "title pawn" and a "title loan"
are not the same things, the Georgia Pawnshop Act itself defines a "pawn transaction" as a type
of "loan." Additionally, NATL and CLM assert the motion fails because TitleMax Georgia has
not pointed to record evidence establishing as a matter of law that any consumers have actually
been deceived or that TitleMax has been or is likely to be damaged by NATL and CLM's use of
the word "loan" in their advertising.
Having considered the record, the Court finds that questions of material fact preclude
summary judgment. This is not a case of literally false advertising. The Georgia Pawnshop Act
requires pawnbrokers to include in their advertising the words "pawn" and "pawn transaction"
and prohibits their use of the term "loan" in advertising their business. However, the Act itself
defines a "pawnbroker" as "any person engaged in whole or in part in the business of lending
money on the security of pledged goods" and defines "pawn transaction" to include "any loan on
the security of pledged goods." See O.C.G.A. §44-12-130(2) and (3), supra. See also Black's
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "loan" as "[a]n act oflending; a grant of something for
temporary use ... esp., a sum of money lent at interest"; defining "secured loan" as a "loan that is
secured by property or securities"; defining "title loan" as "[a] short-term high-interest loan
secured by the borrower's car or other motor vehicle").
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Although there may be material distinctions between title pawns and traditional loans,
NATL and CLM's use of the word "loan" in advertising is not literally false on its face and
whether it is misleading or likely to deceive consumers remains a jury question. In supplemental
briefing, TitleMax cites to two double-blind consum er surveys (one online and one by telephone)
of more than 300 Georgians that was implemented by Nicholas M. Didow, Ph.D. The surveys
were designed to measure "Georgia consumers' attitudes, behavioral intentions, and preferences
for a title loan company offering title loans versus a title pawn company offering title pawns" to
enable Dr. Didow "to offer a research-based professional opinion as to whether LoanM ax was
and is likely advantaged in the Georgia marketplace by positioning and marketing itself as a title
loan company offering title loans rather than as a title pawn company offering title pawns.:"
Based on the results Dr. Didow opines, inter alia, that: the surveys provide "strong

compelling evidence that a company like LoanMax would be viewed more favorably in the
Georgia marketplace and would be more advantaged in the Georgia marketplace as a title loan
company offering title loan products, rather than as a title pawn company offering title pawn
products"; Georgia consumers vary considerably as to whether they think "title loans" and "title
pawns" are the same thing or different things, with the largest percentage of respondents
indicating they "don't know"; however, title "loan" companies offering title "loan" products are
consistently rated more favorably than title "pawn" companies offering title "pawns" and
respondents strongly preferred title "loan" companies when presented with a choice between the
two.9
Although these results may generally support TitleMax's allegations and claims, they are
not dispositive. In the final analysis, how compelling the survey results are and the weight to be
Supplement to Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. 's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, Ex. A (Affidavit of Nicholas Didow) at Ex. I ("Didow Report") at p. 3.
9
DidowReportatpp. 8, 14-15, 19.
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given to them remain important jury questions. Relatedly, whether Plaintiffs' use of the word
"loan" in advertising is "misleading in context" or is "likely to deceive" or confuse consumers,
whether it is likely to influence consumer's purchasing decisions, and whether TitleMax Georgia
has been injured as a result present genuine disputes of material fact (among others) that cannot
be determined as a matter of law based on the record of this action. TitleMax Georgia's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.

III.

NATL and CLM's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
NATL and CLM move for summary judgment on all claims asserted in TitleMax

Georgia's First Counterclaim, i.e. (1) unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act;
(2) unfair competition in violation of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act; and (3) civil
conspiracy.

A. Lanham Act claim
NA TL and CLM assert they are entitled to summary judgment on TitleMax Georgia false
advertising claim under the Lanham Act for the same reasons set forth in their opposition to
TitleMax Georgia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. However, for the reasons
summarized above, the Court finds material questions of fact preclude summary judgment on
this claim. To the extent NA TL and CLM assert their use of the word "loan" in advertising is not
false or misleading to a reasonable consumer as a matter oflaw, it appears the State has taken the
position that such conduct constitutes an "unfair or deceptive" practice "in the conduct of
consumer transactions" such that it violates the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A.
§ 10-1-393(a). See State of Georgia ex rel. Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General of the State of
Georgia v. First American Title Lending of Georgia, LLC, Superior Court of Fulton County, No.
2017CV297877 (lawsuit brought by the Georgia Attorney General against a pawnbroker for
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using the term "loan" in advertising and not using "pawn" or "pawn transactions", taking the
position that such conduct violates O.C.G.A. §44-12-138(a)(l) as well as the Georgia Fair
Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-393(a)). Construing the evidence most favorably to
TitleMax Georgia as the non-movant and giving it the benefit of all reasonable doubts and
possible inferences, whether NATL and CLM's prior use of the word "loan" in their advertising
constitutes actionable false advertising under the Lanham Act presents a jury question. NA TL
and CLM's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED with respect to this claim.

B. Uniform Deceptive Trade Practice Act claim
TitleMax Georgia alleges NATL and CLM (and the other Counterclaim-Defendants)
have engaged in a deceptive trade practice by representing that services provided by them have
characteristics that they do not have; namely that the pawns they offer are loans.l" TitleMax
Georgia seeks injunctive relief, enjoining the Counterclaim Defendants from further use of the
term "loan" in their names and advertising.

11

Under Georgia's Uniform Deceptive Trade Practice Act ("UDTPA"), "[a] person
engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his business ... he ... [r]epresents that
goods or services have ... characteristics ... that he does not have" or "advertises goods or services
with intent not to sell them as advertised." O.C.G.A.§ 10-l-372(a)(5) and (9). "A person likely to
be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another may be granted an injunction against it
under the principles of equity and on terms that the court considers reasonable." O.C.G.A. § 1 O- l373(a). However, only injunctive relief is available as "[i]t is well established that monetary
relief is not authorized under the [UDTPA]." Akron Pest Control v. Radar Exterminating Co.,

10

Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Second Amended Complaint and Defendants' Amended
Counterclaims, First Counterclaim, i!3 7.
11
Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Second Amended Complaint and Defendants' A.mended
Counterclaims, First Counterclaim, ,i4 l.
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216 Ga. App. 495,498,455 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1995) (citation omitted). Further, "[t]he UDTPA
does not address past harm .... To state a claim and to establish standing under the UD TPA, [the]
[p]laintiffs must allege that they are likely to be damaged in the future by an unfair trade
practice." Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, 347 Ga. App. 13, 20, 815 S.E.2d 639,646 (2018),
reconsideration denied (July 16, 2018).
Here, pretermitting whether use of the word "loan" in pawn transaction advertising
constitutes a deceptive trade practice under the UDTPA, currently NATL and CLM "[do]not
operate any stores in Georgia" nor do they "broker, refinance, or advertise title loans." 12 Insofar

as NATL and CLM are no longer engaged in any title lending business or advertising in Georgia,
TitleMax Georgia cannot show that it is likely to be damaged in the future" by NATL and
CLM's conduct. Thus, TitleMax Georgia's request for injunctive relief under the UDTPA
specifically against NATL and CLM is moot. See Goodrich v. Bank of Am., N.A., 329 Ga. App.
41, 42, 762 S.E.2d 628, 630 (2014) ("A case is moot when its resolution would amount to the
determination of an abstract question not arising upon existing facts or rights").13 Accordingly,
NATL and CLM's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to
TitleMax Georgia's UDTPA claim against them.
C. Civil conspiracy claim
TitleMax Georgia alleges NATL and CLM "have conspired with each other to engage in
deceptive trade practices by representing to the public that they are allowed to use the term 'loan'
in their names and advertising."
A conspiracy upon which a civil action for damages may be founded is a
combination between two or more persons either to do some act which is a
tort, or else to do some lawful act by methods which constitute a tort.
12

Kenneth Wayco Aff. (October 12, 2017), ii,r 6- 7.
The viability of TitleMax Georgia's UDTPA claim against the entities currently operating "Cash Loans on
Car Titles" and "Atlanta Title Loans" is not before the Court in the instant motions.
13
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Wh ere civil liability for a conspiracy is sought to be imposed, the
conspiracy itself furnishes no cause of action. The gist of the action, if a
cause of action exists, is not the conspiracy alleged, but the tort committed
against the plaintiff and the resulting damage.
Cook v. Robinson, 216 Ga. 328, 328-29, 116 S.E.2d 742, 744-45 ( 1960) ( citing Martha Mills v.
Moseley, 50 Ga. App. 536, 179 S.E. 159, 161 (1935)). Thus, "[a]bsent the underlying tort, there
can be no liability for civil conspiracy." Hartsock v. Rich's Employees Credit Union, 279 Ga.
App. 724,726,632 S.E.2d 476,478 (2006) (citation omitted).
NA TL and CLM urge that because as a matter of law they are not liable for any violation
of the Lanham Act or Georgia's UDTPA, TitleMax Georgia's claim for civil conspiracy also
fails as a matter of law. However, insofar as TitleMax Georgia's Lanham Act claim survives, its
conspiracy claim predicated on that Act survives as well. Accordingly, NATL and CLM's
Motion for Partial Summ ary Judgm ent is DENIED with respect to the civil conspiracy claim
premised on the Lanham Act claim and is GRA NTED with respect to the civil conspiracy claim
predicated on the failed UDTP A claim.

CONCLUSION
Given all of the above, the Court hereby: DENIES TitleMax Georgia's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment; and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART NATL and CLM's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment as set forth above.
SO ORDERED this

/ :VaayofMarch, 2019.
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